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ings since the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London.1 In
Kaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp.,2 and Goldstein v. New
York State Urban Development Corp.,3 the Court of Appeals set new lows
in allowing extremely dubious “blight” condemnations. The court ruled
that such condemnations are permissible under the state constitution’s Public Use Clause, which permits private property to be condemned only for a
“public use.”4 It also adopted an extremely narrow approach to interpreting
what qualifies as an unconstitutional “pretextual taking.”5
This Article analyzes these aspects of Kaur and Goldstein, and argues
that the New York Court of Appeals erred badly, by allowing highly abusive blight condemnations and defining pretextual takings so narrowly as
to essentially read the concept out of existence.
Part I briefly describes the background of the two cases. Goldstein arose
as a result of an effort by influential developer Bruce Ratner to acquire land
in Brooklyn for his Atlantic Yards development project, which includes a
stadium for the New Jersey Nets basketball franchise and mostly market
rate and high-income housing that he plans to build.6 Kaur resulted from
Columbia University’s attempts to expand into the Manhattanville neighborhood of West Harlem.7 When some of the landowners refused to sell,
Ratner and the University successfully lobbied the government to declare
the land they sought to be blighted and use eminent domain to transfer it to
them.8
Part II addresses the issue of blight condemnation. Goldstein and Kaur
both applied an extraordinarily broad definition of “blight” that included
any area where there is “economic underdevelopment” or “stagnation.”9
Almost any property can be described as underdeveloped relative to some
other potential use of the land. In addition, the court ruled that even if the
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For my critique of Kelo, see Ilya Somin, Controlling the
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183,
227-44 (2007) [hereinafter Somin, Grasping Hand].
2. 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
3. 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. (a).
5. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (noting that the government is not “allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a
private benefit”); id. at 477 (explaining that “pretextual takings,” where the official rationale for the taking is a pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular
private party,” are unconstitutional).
6. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166.
7. See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 724-25.
8. See id.; Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 166.
9. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris,
335 N.E.2d 327, 331 (N.Y. 1975)).
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property somehow falls outside this definition, state judges can only strike
down a condemnation if “there is no room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is blighted.”10 But with just about any area,
there is at least some room for “reasonable” difference of opinion on the
question of whether it is stagnant or underdeveloped.
In adopting an extremely broad definition of blight, the Court of Appeals
was roughly in line with many other states that define blight expansively.11
Even so, this definition is at odds with the text of the New York Constitution, which allows blight condemnations only in “substandard and insanitary areas [sic].”12
Moreover, the court broke dubious new ground in three other crucial respects. First, it chose to uphold the condemnations despite evidence suggesting that the studies the government relied on to prove the presence of
“blight” were deliberately rigged to produce a predetermined result.13
Second, it dismissed as unimportant the fact that the firm which conducted
the studies had a serious conflict of interest in that it had previously been
on the payroll of Ratner and Columbia—the private parties that stood to
benefit from the blight condemnations.14 Finally, the court refused to give
any weight to extensive evidence indicating that Ratner and Columbia had
themselves created or allowed most of the “blighted” conditions subsequently used to justify the condemnations to develop.15 Both separately
and in combination, these three elements of the court’s approach are extremely troubling. They open the door to serious abuses of the blight condemnation process on behalf of politically influential private interests.
Part III discusses Goldstein and Kaur’s treatment of the federal constitutional standard for “pretextual” takings. In Kelo and earlier decisions, federal courts made clear that “pretextual” takings remain unconstitutional despite the Supreme Court’s otherwise highly deferential posture on “public

10. Id.
11. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and
the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 307 (2004); Ilya Somin, Blight
Sweet Blight, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2006, at 42 [hereinafter Somin, Blight Sweet Blight];
see also Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2120-30 (2009) [hereinafter Somin, Limits of Backlash] (describing
how highly permissive blight condemnation laws have persisted in many states even in the
aftermath of recent reform efforts).
12. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 9.
13. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 189-90 (Smith, J., dissenting).
14. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 726 (N.Y. 2010), cert.
denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
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use” issues.16 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been extremely unclear as to what constitutes a “pretextual taking.”17 As a result, both state
courts and lower federal courts have taken widely differing approaches to
the issue.18
Nevertheless, Kaur and Goldstein are outliers in this area, deferring to
the government more than any other court that has addressed the question
since Kelo. In Goldstein, the property owners’ federal pretext claim had
already been rejected by the Second Circuit.19 I therefore analyze the federal decision in that case, as well as the state decision.
State and federal courts have identified four possible indications of a
pretextual condemnation: the magnitude of the expected public benefits of
the taking; the extent of the planning process that led to it; whether or not
the taking has an identifiable private beneficiary whose identity was known
in advance; and evidence of the intentions of the condemning authorities.20
In Kaur and Goldstein, all four of these factors were present. Yet the New
York Court of Appeals in Kaur dismissed the property owners’ pretextual
takings claims out of hand. The Second Circuit did much the same in
Goldstein. With one possible exception,21 these were the most extreme
pro-government pretext rulings of the post-Kelo era. They open the door to
a wide range of pretextual condemnations.
Overall, Goldstein and Kaur probably rank among the most dubious
blight condemnation decisions in American history. They make it easier
than ever for well-connected interest groups to use blight condemnations to

16. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005). For citations to preKelo federal decisions striking down pretextual takings, see Ilya Somin, Introduction: The
Judicial Reaction to Kelo, 4 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1, 26 n.143 (2011) (symposium on
eminent domain in the United States) [hereinafter Somin, Judicial Reaction].
17. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 174-75, 185 (2009) (noting this lack of clarity); Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 24.
18. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 25-35 (describing different approaches to this issue adopted by various courts).
19. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit applied
similarly extreme deference in an unpublished 2006 decision, Didden v. Village of Port
Chester, 173 F. App’x 931 (2d Cir. 2006), which later became briefly famous because future
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor served on the panel as a Second Circuit Judge at
the time. For discussions of Didden, see Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s Record on Constitutional
Property Rights: Testimony Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Ilya Somin, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University),
available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/news/2009/Somin_TestimonySotomayor.
pdf; Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 31-34.
20. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 184-99; Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 2425.
21. See supra note 19.
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transfer property to themselves at the expense of those with less political
influence.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE TWO CASES
Both Goldstein and Kaur arose in large part as a result of efforts by private interest groups to acquire land for their own purposes. While that fact
does not by itself prove that the resulting condemnations were unjustified
or illegal, recognition of it is essential to any understanding of the two cases’ history.
A.

The Background to Goldstein

In Goldstein, the court upheld a major condemnation as part of the Atlantic Yards development project. The Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC), a state agency, took a large area for the purpose of transferring it to Forest City Ratner (FCR), a firm owned by politically influential
developer Bruce Ratner. Ratner sought to use the site primarily to build
high-income housing and a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets basketball
team, which he owned at the time.22 First announced in 2003, the Atlantic
Yards project was intended to include sixteen high-rise buildings, office
and retail space, and a new stadium for the New Jersey Nets, of which
Ratner was the majority owner until 2009.23 The project area in question
covered twenty-two acres and included a variety of buildings used for both
residential and commercial purposes.24 Far from being a slum of any kind,
much of it was actually middle class housing located in a reasonably welloff neighborhood.25

22. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 166 (N.Y. 2009)
(noting that only about one-third of the over 5300 housing units to be constructed would be
affordable for middle- or low-income residents). An intermediate appellate court had previously ruled that the construction of the basketball stadium was a permissible “public purpose.” See Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 424
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
23. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment Policy, Judicial Deference to
Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards Project, 42 URB. LAW.
287, 288-89 (2010).
24. Id. at 287-88.
25. For accounts of the area and its characteristics, see NEIL DEMAUSE & JOANNA CAGAN, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO
PRIVATE PROFIT 280 (rev. ed. 2008) (noting that the area in question was “prime Brooklyn
real estate” at the nexus of several “booming neighborhoods”); Lavine & Oder, supra note
24, at 291-94; Damon W. Root, When Public Power is Used for Private Gain, REASON.COM
(Oct. 8, 2009), http://reason.com/archives/2009/10/08/when-public-power-is-used-for [hereinafter Root, Public Power].
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Not until 2005, thirty-one months after the project was announced and
seventeen months after it was endorsed by the city and state governments,
did the ESDC—the government agency that approved the project and later
sanctioned the use of eminent domain—conclude that the area in question
was “blighted.”26 The “blight” study commissioned by the ESDC was undertaken by Allen, King, Rosen, and Fleming (AKRF), a consulting firm
with serious conflict of interest problems.27
FCR and city officials claimed that the Atlantic Yards project would
produce some 2250 “affordable” housing units, as well as several thousand
others.28 However, most of “the units that are labeled affordable will in
fact be at or above market rate for Brooklyn, and out of the price range for
many existing residents.”29 Moreover, FCR is not legally required to build
more than three hundred of the “affordable” units for many years; in the
meantime, hundreds of existing housing units in the area have been destroyed as a result of the project and its use of eminent domain.30
Similarly, claims that the project will produce massive increases in jobs
and economic development are questionable in light of the fact that the
project has absorbed hundreds of millions of dollars in public subsidies
(even without counting the use of eminent domain as an implicit subsidy),
and the FCR has no legal obligation to actually produce any of the promised jobs.31 A 2009 New York City Independent Budget Office report
found that the arena portion of the project would result in only a modest
twenty-five million dollar net increase in tax revenue for the City and an
actual loss of forty million dollars in revenue for the state over the next
thirty years.32 Moreover, the net increase for the City is wiped out once we
take account of later revelations showing a previously unaccounted for thirty-one million dollars in infrastructure subsidies for the project.33 Including this sum in the analysis would make the fiscal impact for both levels of
government negative.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 298.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 318-19.
Id. at 319.
See id. at 320-21.
See id. at 322-27.
N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL BRIEF: THE PROPOSED ARENA AT ATLANTIC
YARDS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITY FISCAL GAINS AND LOSSES 8 (2009), available at http://www.
ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/AtlanticYards091009.pdf. Unfortunately, the Independent Budget
Office chose not to analyze the project as a whole, and instead analyzed only the arena portion of the project. See id. at 2.
33. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 324.
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Because the Atlantic Yards takings encompassed a large area and threatened to forcibly displace many people and businesses, the project aroused
widespread public opposition and a series of lawsuits that culminated in
decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and New York’s highest
state court upholding the takings.34
B.

The Background to Kaur

The Kaur takings arose from an effort by Columbia University to acquire property for expansion in Harlem’s Manhattanville neighborhood in
New York City.35 Beginning in 2001, Columbia sought, in conjunction
with city agencies, to acquire some seventeen acres of property in Manhattanville in order to build new educational and research facilities for its
campus.36 By 2003, it owned some fifty-one percent of the land in the
area.37 In early 2004, Columbia began meeting with the ESDC to discuss
condemnation of the remaining land.38 As a result of these meetings, the
ESDC hired Columbia’s consultant, AKRF, to conduct a “blight” study that
could justify the use of eminent domain to condemn those properties that
remained outside Columbia’s control.39 In 2007, AKRF completed a study
that, as expected, concluded that the area was “blighted.”40 Subsequently,
the ESDC authorized the condemnation of certain property for Columbia’s
project.41
As with the Atlantic Yards project, the Columbia takings generated extensive media coverage and public resistance.42

34. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban
Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).
35. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
36. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009),
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
37. Id. at 12.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 13; see also infra Part II.B.
41. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
42. See, e.g., Keith H. Hurokawa & Patricia Salkin, Can Urban University Expansion
and Sustainable Development Co-Exist?: A Case Study in Progress on Columbia University,
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 637, 684-88 (2010) (describing the controversy over the use of eminent domain).
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II. A BLIGHT UNTO THE WORLD: UPHOLDING UNCONSTRAINED
BLIGHT CONDEMNATIONS.
The Goldstein and Kaur decisions both rely on an extremely broad definition of “blight,” while also overlooking considerable evidence of malfeasance in securing blight designations even under that definition.
Extremely broad definitions of blight are far from unusual in state law.43
Many of the eminent domain reform laws enacted by state governments in
the wake of Kelo v. City of New London are likely to be ineffective because, although they forbid “economic development” condemnations, they
leave in place extraordinarily broad definitions of blight.44 These blight
laws allow almost any area to be designated as “blighted” and subsequently
condemned.45 For example, state courts have ruled that such unlikely areas
as New York City’s Times Square and downtown Las Vegas are blighted,
thereby justifying condemnations that transferred property to the New York
Times and politically influential casino owners respectively.46
However, several post-Kelo state judicial decisions outside of New York
have begun to crack down on broad definitions of blight, either invalidating
them under their state constitutional “public use” clauses or at least limiting
their application.47 Decisions by the Ohio and New Jersey supreme courts
and a Pennsylvania appellate court have all trended in that direction.48
Kaur and Goldstein are therefore outliers relative to recent decisions in
other states, since they not only endorse a virtually limitless definition of
blight, but also make judicial review of blight designations in New York
even more deferential than before.49

43. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 11, at 2114-20.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. Pappas, 76 P.3d 1, 7,
15 (Nev. 2003); W. 41st St. Realty L.L.C. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 744 N.Y.S.2d
121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
47. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 12-15 (discussing the relevant cases).
48. See Gallenthin Realty Dev. Co. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 924 A.2d 447, 460 (N.J.
2007) (ruling that open space cannot be designated as “blighted” and condemned); City of
Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1144-47 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the state constitution does not permit an area to be declared “blighted” merely because it is “deteriorating”);
In re Condemnation by the Redevelopment Auth. of Lawrence Cnty., 962 A.2d 1257, 1263
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (holding that a blighted property has an “an actual, objectively negative use of the property rather than merely a use relatively less profitable than another”).
The Pennsylvania case was apparently litigated under the state’s broader pre-Kelo definition
of blight, which has since been displaced by a narrower one enacted in its post-Kelo reform
law. See Somin, Limits of Backlash, supra note 11, at 2141-42 (describing the new law).
49. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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Even more strikingly, Goldstein and Kaur exceeded previous New York
decisions and rulings in other states by endorsing blight designations obtained under highly dubious circumstances. In both cases the blight designation was based on a study conducted by a firm with a serious conflict of
interest. Both cases also relied heavily on “blight” discovered on land that
was already owned by the private entity that stood to benefit from the condemnation of other land in the area.
A.

A Virtually Limitless Definition of Blight

Both Goldstein and Kaur relied on a definition of blight so broad as to
be virtually limitless. Indeed, the Goldstein opinion itself notes that the Atlantic Yards area “do[es] not begin to approach in severity the dire circumstances of urban slum dwelling” that led to the enactment of the state
constitution’s blight amendment in 1938.50 To get around this problem, the
court held that blight alleviation is “not limited to ‘slums’ as that term was
formerly applied, and that, among other things, economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public, sufficient to make their
removal a cognizable public purpose.”51 Kaur, in turn, applied the definition of “blight” adopted in Goldstein.52
Just about any area occasionally suffers from “economic underdevelopment” or “stagnation” and therefore could potentially be condemned under
this rationale. Moreover, even under this expansive definition of blight, the
decision allows courts to strike down a condemnation only if “there is no
room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether an area is
blighted.”53 With any neighborhood, there is nearly always “room for reasonable difference of opinion” as to whether the area is “underdeveloped”
relative to some possible alternative uses of the land. Defining blight this
broadly, and then deferring to the government’s determination of whether
such “blight” actually exists, comes close to reading the public use restriction out of the state constitution.
It is unlikely that Article XVIII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution—the amendment allowing condemnation of “substandard and insanitary areas [sic]”54—was originally understood to mean that virtually

50. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171 (N.Y. 2009).
51. Id. at 172 (quoting Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 N.E.2d 327, 331
(N.Y. 1975)).
52. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 730-31 (N.Y. 2010),
cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822
(2010).
53. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172.
54. N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
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any area could be declared blighted and condemned. The earliest New
York Court of Appeals decision interpreting the amendment described it as
applying to “slum areas.”55 As that ruling pointed out, the amendment may
have been intended to codify a 1936 New York Court of Appeals decision
that upheld the use of eminent domain for the “clearing, replanning, and
reconstruction of slum areas and the providing of housing accommodations
for persons of low income.”56
This interpretation of Article XVIII is supported by the records of the
Constitutional Convention of 1938, where proponents of the amendment
repeatedly emphasized that it focused on “slum clearance.”57 One key supporter defined the meaning of that key term as follows:
Slum clearance is the redemption of areas where the physical condition of
the housing and the neighborhood is so squalid, so demoralized, so lacking in light, ventilation, fire protection and sanitation, so overcrowded
with buildings and people that the existence of such areas endangers the
health, safety and morals of those living there and impairs the welfare of
the entire community wherein such areas exist.58

Article XVIII was one of many state statutory and constitutional blight
laws enacted during this period for the purpose of alleviating “slum-like”
conditions.59 Efforts to expand the definition of blight to cover non-slum
areas only emerged much later.
In fairness, Goldstein’s definition of “blight” was adopted from earlier
decisions, such as the New York State Court of Appeals’ 1975 ruling in
Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Morris,60 which defined blight
as including “underdevelopment and stagnation” as well as “slums.”61

55. See Murray v. LaGuardia, 52 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 1943).
56. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 1 N.E.2d 153, 153 (N.Y. 1936).
57. See REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, APRIL FIFTH TO AUGUST TWENTY-SIXTH, 1938, at 1512-85 (1938) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]; see also Amy Lavine, From Slum Clearance to Economic Development: A Retrospective of Redevelopment Policies in New York State, 4 ALBANY GOV’T
L. REV. 212 (2011) (describing origins of the 1938 amendment in efforts to facilitate slum
clearance).
58. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 57, at 1531 (statement of Harold Riegelman). Riegelman was a leading advocate of liberal housing legislation and of Article XVIII.
See generally Dorothy J. Gaiter, Harold Riegelman, A Civic Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1982, at 1.
59. See generally Wendell Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal
and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003) (arguing that
eminent domain has often been used at the expense of individual property owners and to the
benefit of purely private interests).
60. 335 N.E.2d 327 (N.Y. 1975).
61. Id. at 330. The Goldstein majority opinion relied heavily on Yonkers. See Goldstein
v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 171-72 (N.Y. 2009).
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Nevertheless, these earlier cases, like Goldstein itself, seem to be at variance with the text and original meaning of Article XVIII. Indeed, the
Yonkers court itself acknowledged that “urban renewal began as an effort to
remove ‘substandard and insanitary’ conditions which threatened the health
and welfare of the public, in other words ‘slums.’”62
Moreover, no previous Court of Appeals decision had combined a very
broad definition of blight with the conclusion that, even under this definition, property owners may not successfully challenge a blight designation
unless there could be “no reasonable difference of opinion” as to whether
the area is blighted.63 Indeed, as Judge Robert Smith pointed out in his dissent, Yonkers noted that “courts are required to be more than rubber stamps
in the determination of the existence of substandard conditions,” and actually found that the government had failed to sufficiently prove that one of
the areas it sought to condemn was “substandard.”64
B.

Endorsing Highly Biased Blight Determination Studies

Goldstein and Kaur went beyond merely adopting an extremely broad
definition of blight. They also overlooked extensive evidence indicating
that the blight studies commissioned by the Empire State Development
Corporation were heavily biased and deliberately rigged to reach a predetermined conclusion.
As Judge Smith recognized in his dissenting opinion in Goldstein, the
original rationale for the condemnation was “economic development—job
creation and the bringing of a professional basketball team to Brooklyn.”65
Apparently, “nothing was said about ‘blight’ by the sponsors of the project
until 2005,” when the ESDC realized that a blight determination might be
needed for legal reasons.66 Moreover, the decision to condemn the property had already been made, and AKRF, the firm conducting the blight study,
knew what outcome the condemning authorities sought. As Judge Smith
suggested, “[i]n light of the special status accorded to blight in the New
62. Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1).
63. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 172. A 1953 case cited by the Goldstein majority did rule
that a blight determination should be upheld if it were not made “corruptly or irrationally or
baselessly.” Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953). Still, as Judge Smith
pointed out in his dissent, this case did not involve the use of blight designations to condemn property, but rather a challenge by a taxpayer to the use of tax revenue for purchase of
such property. See Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting). The Kaskel court
noted that the legal standard it adopted applies only to “a taxpayer’s action under section 51
of the General Municipal Law.” Kaskel, 115 N.E.2d at 661.
64. Goldstein, 921 N.E.2d at 188 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Yonkers, 335 N.E.2d at
333).
65. Id. at 189.
66. Id.
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York law of eminent domain, the inference that it was a pretext, not the
true motive for this development, seems compelling.”67
AKRF also had a major conflict of interest. The firm was originally
hired and paid by Ratner himself,68 though its official relationship with
Ratner’s firm had technically ended by the time it conducted the blight
study (at which time, however, Ratner was still paying its bills).69 Despite
its awareness of AKRF’s relationship with Ratner, the ESDC awarded it a
multi-million dollar no-bid contract to conduct the blight study.70 As a
lower court judge noted in another case generated by the Atlantic Yards
project, the ESDC uses AKRF as its “perennial environmental consultant.”71 ESDC officials have noted that AKRF “always produces studies
that are in accord with the agency’s plans.”72 At a hearing conducted by
New York State Senator Bill Perkins in January 2010, ESDC representatives admitted that AKRF had always concluded that a property was
blighted whenever asked to do a blight study by the agency.73 Even worse,
AKRF’s contract with the ESDC specifically required the firm to conduct a
“blight study in support of the proposed project,”74 which strongly suggests
that the firm was instructed to conclude that the area was blighted, since the
project could not go forward without such a finding.
AKRF therefore had very strong incentives to produce a study that facilitated the goals of both Ratner and the ESDC. Perhaps for that reason, the
firm strained to find evidence of blight in its report, counting minor flaws
67. Id.
68. See Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 312.
69. See id. at 312-13.
70. See id. at 313.
71. Develop Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 426
(N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (Catterson, J., concurring).
72. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 313-14.
73. See Eliot Brown, Who Has the Right to Say What’s Blight? Bill Perkins vs. ESDC
Darling, N.Y. OBSERVER (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.observer.com/2010/real-estate/billperkins-no-fan-blight-consultant-akrf-esdc; see also Norman Oder, At Hearing, ESDC Representatives Defend Use Of Consultant AKRF; Perkins Slams “Egregious Conflict Of Interest” Given Simultaneous Work For Developers, ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT (Jan. 7, 2010,
8:35 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/01/at-hearing-esdc-representativesdefend.html (discussing these hearings).
74. Reply Appendix for Petitioners-Plaintiffs-Appellants Atlantic Yards Arena and Development Project—Contract Scope for an Environmental Impact Statement at 28, Develop
Don’t Destroy Brooklyn v. Urban Dev. Corp., 874 N.Y.S.2d 414, 424 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009) (No. 104597/07), available at http://dddb.net/FEIS/appeal/080822ReplyAppendix.
pdf (emphasis added). For a discussion of this aspect of the contract, see Norman Oder,
Was AKRF Really Hired To Do A Study Of Neighborhood Conditions? It Was Hired To
“Prepare A Blight Study In Support Of The Proposed Project,” ATLANTIC YARDS REPORT
(Jan. 12, 2010, 2:54 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2010/01/was-akrf-reallyhired-to-do-study-of.html.
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such as “weeds,” “graffiti,” “cracked sidewalks,” and “underutilization.”75
The AKRF study ignored the obvious point that the city government itself
was responsible for maintaining the sidewalks and keeping them free of
weeds.76 In one instance, a “mural protesting the use of eminent domain”
was classified as evidence of blight.77
Kaur similarly featured a probably rigged blight study conducted by
AKRF. An earlier Appellate Division ruling forcing the ESDC to disclose
relevant documents in the Columbia litigation had rebuked the agency for
hiring AKRF to conduct the blight study due to the fact that the firm had a
conflict of interest and had essentially acted as Columbia’s “agent.”78
AKRF, the court ruled, had been “serving two masters” simultaneously.79
Because of this background, the taking in Kaur had been invalidated in a
close three-to-two plurality decision by New York’s intermediate appellate
court, the Appellate Division.80 When Columbia presented the agency with
a plan to use eminent domain to acquire the remaining property and use it
for its “sole benefit,” a blight study was commissioned from AKRF, which
was simultaneously employed by Columbia on the development project’s
general plan.81
AKRF was instructed by the ESDC to use a methodology “biased in Columbia’s favor,” that allowed blight to be proven by the presence of minor
defects such as “unpainted block walls or loose awning supports.”82 But as
the Appellate Division concluded, “[v]irtually every neighborhood in the
five boroughs will yield similar instances of disrepair that can be captured
in close-up technicolor.”83

75. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 298-99; Root, Public Power, supra note 25.
76. Lavine & Oder, supra note 24, at 299.
77. Id.
78. See Tuck-It-Away Assocs. L.P. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 861 N.Y.S.2d 51, 59-60
(N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
79. Id. at 59.
80. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009),
rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State
Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 17. Later, another firm was hired to conduct an independent blight study, but
it was required to use the same flawed methodology. See id. at 18. For more details on the
biases and flaws in the blight study, see Damon W. Root, Holding Justice Kennedy to His
Word: Why the Supreme Court Must Put a Stop to Columbia University’s Eminent Domain
Abuse, REASON.COM (Sept. 29, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/09/29/holdingjustice-kennedy-to-his; see also Damon W. Root, College Cheats: Columbia Blighted Own
Hood, N.Y. POST, Feb. 16, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/
item_oZsTv770SurlHI5f5BJlQO;jsessionid=DD25B89035A1B3D03970A76560585183
[hereinafter Root, College Cheats].
83. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
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The Appellate Division therefore ruled that the area could not be considered blighted; it also ruled that the blight findings were an unconstitutional “pretextual” taking, since the biased blight study showed that the blight
rationale was a mere pretext for a scheme to benefit Columbia.84
The New York Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the Appellate
Division, relying primarily on the extremely broad definition of blight
upheld in Goldstein just a few months earlier.85 The court refused to consider most of the evidence showing that the AKRF study deliberately used
biased methodology, claiming only that AKRF’s objectivity was not compromised merely “because Columbia had previously engaged AKRF” to
produce its development plan for the area.86 The court also noted that
AKRF’s findings were confirmed by a study conducted by a different firm,
Earth Tech,87 but did not consider the relevance of the fact that that firm
was also required to use the same biased methodology as AKRF.88 The
court further noted that a third firm, Urbitran, had conducted a study finding blight in the area prior to AKRF’s study, thereby calling into question
the Appellate Division’s finding that there was no evidence of blight prior
to the acquisition of most of the area by Columbia.89 But, the New York
Court of Appeals did not dispute the Appellate Division’s finding that the
ESDC chose not to rely on the Urbitran study in making its decision to
condemn the property, and had in fact commissioned the AKRF study because ESDC staff doubted the adequacy of the Urbitran findings.90
C.

Blight Designations Based on the Blight Created by the Very
Parties that Stood to Gain from Condemnation

In both Goldstein and Kaur, the New York Court of Appeals refused to
consider extensive evidence suggesting that much of the “blight” used to
justify condemnation of the areas in question was in fact created by the
very parties that stood to benefit from the takings.

84. Id. at 18, 20.
85. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied
sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010). Judge
Smith, the sole dissenter in Goldstein, concurred in Kaur only because of the force of the
earlier precedent. See id. at 737 (Smith, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 731-32.
87. See id. at 727.
88. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
89. Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at 733.
90. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12-13. The New York Court of Appeals incorrectly
stated that the Appellate Division had “ignored” the Urbitran study. See Kaur, 933 N.E.2d at
733.

SOMIN_CHRISTENSEN

2011]

6/7/2011 7:04 PM

LET THERE BE BLIGHT

1207

In Goldstein, by the time the AKRF blight study was conducted in 2005,
Forest City Ratner already owned a substantial proportion of the property
in the area (acquired in part through the threat of eminent domain), and had
allowed some of it to deteriorate.91 As Damon Root explains, “Ratner had
already acquired many of the properties he wanted (thanks to eminent domain) and left them empty, thus creating much of the unsightly neglect he
now cites in support of his project.”92 Other areas may have fallen into disrepair in part because “Ratner’s plan to acquire the properties and demolish
the buildings had been public knowledge for years when the blight study
was conducted,” and owners therefore had no reason to invest in their
property’s upkeep.93
In Kaur, as in Goldstein, there was little evidence of actual blight prior
to the acquisition of much of the property in the area by the expected beneficiaries of eminent domain. Indeed, the Appellate Division concluded that
there was “no evidence whatsoever that Manhattanville was blighted prior
to Columbia gaining control over the vast majority of property therein.”94
The Empire State Development Corporation only ordered a blight study after Columbia had already acquired most of the property in the area and
therefore “gained control over the very properties that would form the basis
for a subsequent blight study.”95
Most of the alleged blight that was found by AKRF was located on
property owned by Columbia itself, and was possibly allowed to develop in
order to justify a blight finding.96 In 2002, not long after Columbia began
to acquire land in the area, a study conducted by Ernst & Young for the
New York City Economic Development Corporation found that fifty-four
of the sixty-seven properties in the project area were in “good,” “very
good,” or “fair” condition.97 By contrast, the AKRF study, which was conducted just a few years later in 2007 when Columbia already owned most
of the area, found that forty-eight of the sixty-seven properties were “substandard.”98 If AKRF’s conclusions are correct, the implication is that many
91. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
92. Root, Public Power, supra note 25.
93. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 190 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
94. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
95. Id. at 21.
96. See Root, College Cheats, supra note 82 (noting that Columbia already owned seventy-six percent of the land in the area at the time of the study and that “the university refused to perform basic and necessary repairs, thereby pushing tenants out of Columbiaowned buildings and manufacturing the ugly conditions that later advanced the school’s
real-estate interests”).
97. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 12.
98. Id. at 13.

SOMIN_CHRISTENSEN

1208

6/7/2011 7:04 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVIII

of the properties deteriorated during the years when Columbia was acquiring land in the area, and much of the alleged “blight” was on land already
owned by Columbia.
D.

Implications

Both Goldstein and Kaur upheld takings under an extremely broad definition of blight. More unusually, both decisions refused to give more than
perfunctory consideration to the strong evidence that the new private owners of the condemned property had rigged blight studies in their favor and
were themselves responsible for a substantial proportion of the alleged
blight those studies found.
In Goldstein, Ratner and the ESDC disputed some of these claims.99
The key point, however, is that the majority refused to even consider the
relevance of a possible conflict of interest, and concluded that the takings
were permissible even if the allegations against the developer and the condemning authority were correct, so long as there was room for “reasonable
difference of opinion” over the presence or absence of blight.100 As the
majority explained:
It may be that the bar has now been set too low—that what will now pass
as “blight,” as that expression has come to be understood and used by political appointees to public corporations relying upon studies paid for by
developers, should not be permitted to constitute a predicate for the invasion of property rights and the razing of homes and businesses. But any
such limitation upon the sovereign power of eminent domain as it has
come to be defined in the urban renewal context is a matter for the Legislature, not the courts.101

The upshot of the court’s rulings is that developers and other politically
influential interest groups are free to lobby for blight designations obtained
on the basis of studies conducted by firms facing an obvious conflict of interest and acting under biased instructions. Further, the results of such studies are to be assessed under a nearly limitless definition of blight that includes any area which might be “underdeveloped” or “stagnant.”102 Even
under that definition, courts can only invalidate the resulting condemnations if there can be “no reasonable difference of opinion” as to whether an
area is blighted.103 Taken together, Goldstein and Kaur make it virtually

99. See Revised Brief for Respondent at 25-34, Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0178), 2009 WL 3810844.
100. See Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 172 (N.Y. 2009).
101. Id. at 172.
102. See id. at 171-72.
103. See id. at 172.
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impossible to challenge blight condemnations in New York on public use
constitutional grounds. As Justice Catterson of New York’s Appellate Division recently explained, “[u]nfortunately for the rights of the citizens . . .
the recent rulings of the Court of Appeals . . . have made plain that there is
no longer any judicial oversight of eminent domain proceedings.”104
This judicial abdication imperils both the rights of property owners and
effective neighborhood development. Unconstrained blight takings are easily manipulated by powerful interest groups in order to seize property they
covet from the poor and politically weak.105 Because governments lack effective tools for measuring the value of existing land uses, and new owners
of condemned “blighted” property rarely have any binding obligation to
produce the economic benefits that supposedly justify the use of eminent
domain, such takings also routinely end up destroying more economic value than they create.106
To be sure, these dangers exist even with respect to condemnations in
genuinely blighted areas. It is possible that blight condemnations of all
types should be banned.107 But, the problem is greatly exacerbated if, as in
New York, virtually any area can be declared blighted and taken.
Some scholars worry that narrowing the definition of blight without
banning blight takings altogether might end up harming racial minorities
and the poor by singling out their communities as the only ones subject to
blight takings.108 In my view, however, such concerns are outweighed by
the very real benefits that restricting blight condemnations have for racial
minorities and the poor. These groups are disproportionately victimized by
blight condemnations in areas that are not “blighted” in the lay sense of the
term.109 Limiting blight condemnations to “substandard and insanitary
areas [sic],” as required by the New York Constitution,110 is a highly imperfect policy. But, it would be a significant improvement over the status
quo.

104. Uptown Holdings, L.L.C. v. City of New York, 908 N.Y.S.2d 657, 661 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2010) (Catterson, J., concurring).
105. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 264-67.
106. See id. at 190-203 (discussing such problems with both broad blight takings and related “economic development” condemnations).
107. See id. at 269-71. See generally Steven J. Eagle, Does Blight Really Justify Condemnation?, 39 URB. LAW. 833 (2007) (asserting that alternatives to blight condemnation
may be more constitutional).
108. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the
Poor After Kelo, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 365 (2007) (making this argument).
109. See Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW.
U. L. REV. 1931 (2007) (discussing this issue in detail).
110. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 9.
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III. EVISCERATING PRETEXTUAL TAKINGS STANDARDS
In Kelo v. City of New London and previous decisions, the Supreme
Court ruled that, under the Fifth Amendment, virtually any potential public
benefit qualifies as a “public use,” justifying the use of eminent domain.111
The one area where Kelo leaves room for significant judicial scrutiny of
public use issues is that of “pretextual takings,” where the official rationale
for the taking is a pretext “for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on
a particular private party.”112 Unfortunately, Kelo says very little about the
question of how to determine whether or not a taking that transfers property
to a private party is in fact pretextual.113 As the federal district court decision in Goldstein notes, “[a]lthough Kelo held that merely pretextual purposes do not satisfy the public use requirement, the Kelo majority did not
define the term ‘mere pretext.’”114 To add to the confusion, the Kelo majority indicated that one possible indication of a pretextual taking is the
presence of a “one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated development plan.”115 But, 99 Cents Only Stores v.
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, the federal district court case cited by
Justice Stevens as an example of a pure “one-to-one transfer,”116 actually
struck down a taking that the government justified as necessary to implement a previously established redevelopment plan.117 Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Kelo also suggested that a taking may be invalidated
if it showed “impermissible favoritism” to a private party.118 But, like the
majority opinion, which Kennedy joined, he was extremely unclear as to

111. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484-85 (2005); see also Hawaii
Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (concluding that a public use is any objective “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32
(1954) (ruling that the legislature has “well-nigh conclusive” discretion in determining what
counts as a public use); Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 224-25 (discussing Midkiff
and Berman in greater detail).
112. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477; see also id. at 478 (noting that the government is not “allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose
was to bestow a private benefit”).
113. See Kelly, supra note 17, at 174 (noting that the Court “failed to provide much guidance” on this issue).
114. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50
(2d Cir. 2008).
115. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
116. See id. at 487 n.17.
117. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1125-26 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that the case involves condemnation powers established pursuant to the “Amargosa Redevelopment Plan”).
118. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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how to determine what counts as a taking “intended to favor a particular
private party.”119
In his thorough analysis of Kelo’s pretext standard, Professor Daniel
Kelly identifies four criteria that courts use to determine whether a privateto-private taking is pretextual:
 1. The magnitude of the public benefit created by the condemnation.
If the benefits are large, it seems less likely that they are merely
pretextual.
 2. The extensiveness of the planning process that led to the taking.
 3. Whether or not the identity of the private beneficiary of the taking
was known in advance. If the new owner’s identity was unknown to officials at the time they decided to use eminent domain, it is hard to conclude that government undertook the condemnation in order to advance the new owner’s interests.
 4. The intentions of the condemning authorities. Under this approach, courts would investigate the motives of government decision-makers to determine what the true purpose of a condemnation was.120
In the aftermath of Kelo, various state and federal courts disagreed widely as to the relative importance of these four factors.121 The striking fact
about Goldstein and Kaur is that they rejected pretextual takings claims despite strong evidence suggesting that all four factors were present. If none
of the four factors is enough to prove pretext, the New York Court of Appeals’ approach comes close to reading the concept out of existence. At the
very least, if the court’s majority believed that none of the four is an appropriate indication of pretext, it should have explained what, if anything,
would be.122
In Goldstein, the majority probably ignored Kelo’s pretext standard and
the lower court cases interpreting it123 because the property owners’ federal

119. Id. For analyses discussing the lack of clarity in Justice Kennedy’s opinion, see
Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 229-31; Kelly, supra note 17.
120. Kelly, supra note 17, at 184-99. Kelly finds fault with each of these tests, and proposes an alternative approach of his own. See id. at 215-20.
121. See Somin, Judicial Reaction, supra note 16, at 25-35 (discussing these cases).
122. In a 2007 lower court decision, the Appellate Division invalidated a taking as pretextual in a case where the government’s motive was suspect. See 49 WB, L.L.C. v. Vill. of
Haverstraw, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding that a condemnation
was pretextual because “the Village’s true purpose for condemnation was to assist its waterfront developer in meeting the developer’s private scattered-site affordable housing obligation and to reduce costs to the developer”). It is not clear, however, whether this approach
remains viable in New York after the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Goldstein and Kaur.
123. See, e.g., 49 WB, 839 N.Y.S.2d 127.
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constitutional claims had already been rejected in federal court.124 I discuss
this federal case in detail below.125 Nonetheless, the property owners explicitly argued that the blight alleviation rationale for the takings was pretextual under the New York State Constitution,126 and the Court of Appeals
should have at least considered the relevance of recent pretext precedents
from other jurisdictions.
Much less defensibly, the Court of Appeals also completely ignored Kelo and related pretext cases in Kaur, despite the fact that the lower court
decision striking down the Columbia takings relied heavily on Kelo’s pretext analysis.127 Unlike in Goldstein, no federal court had already ruled on
the property owners’ Fifth Amendment pretext claims, and the owners continued to press those arguments in the Court of Appeals.128 Thus, it is difficult to understand why the Kaur court failed to even cite Kelo,129 much
less discuss the relevant federal precedents interpreting pretextual takings.
A.

The Magnitude of Expected Public Benefits

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia130 and some lower
federal courts emphasize the magnitude of expected public benefits as an
indicator of pretext. According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, “[i]f the
property is being transferred to another private party, and the benefits to the
public are only ‘incidental’ or ‘pretextual,’ a ‘pretext’ defense may well
succeed.”131 Under this approach, courts “focus primarily on the benefits

124. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
125. See infra Part III.A.
126. See Brief for Petitioners-Appellants at 13-15, Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0178), 2009 WL 3810843.
127. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10-16 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
128. See Brief for Petitioners-Respondents at 2, 9, 129-39, Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/32282922/
Petitioners-Respondents-brief (pagination in hyperlink).
129. See generally Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d 8.
130. This is the highest court of the District of Columbia, equivalent to a state supreme
court. It should not be confused with the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, a federal intermediate appellate court.
131. Franco v. Nat’l Capital Revitalization Corp., 930 A.2d 160, 173-74 (D.C. 2007). In
MHC Financing Partnership v. City of San Rafael, No. C00-3785VRW, 2006 WL 3507937
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006), the Northern District of California also interpreted Kelo as requiring “‘careful and extensive inquiry into whether, in fact, the development plan is of primary
benefit to the developer . . . . [with] only incidental benefit to the City.’” Id. at *14 (quoting
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 491 (2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). A preKelo Seventh Circuit case also emphasized the importance of the distribution of the benefits
of a taking. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm’n, 306 F.3d 445, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2002) (hold-
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the public hopes to realize from the proposed taking” and compare them to
those expected to be realized by the new private owner.132 This theory
builds on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Kelo, which suggested
that a taking might be invalidated if it has “only incidental or pretextual
public benefits.”133
In Goldstein v. Pataki,134 the federal case addressing the pretextual takings claims of the Atlantic Yards property owners, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the takings should be invalidated because most of
the benefits would flow to Ratner, or because any benefits to the community might be “dwarf[ed]” by the project’s costs.135 So long as a taking is
“rationally related to a classic public use,” the court ruled that the distribution of benefits was irrelevant.136
Much evidence suggests that the benefits of the Kaur takings were similarly skewed. The takings were conducted in accordance with Columbia’s
preexisting plans for expansion.137 As the Appellate Division recognized,
Columbia would be able to use the condemned property for its “sole benefit.”138
The conclusion that the takings will primarily benefit Columbia is reinforced by evidence suggesting that the area in question was already doing
well economically and did not need a massive redevelopment project in order to produce further growth.139 The Appellate Division pointed out that,
“[t]he 2002 West Harlem Master Plan [covering the area that was eventually transferred to Columbia] stated that not only was Harlem experiencing a
renaissance of economic development, but that the area had great development potential that could easily be realized through rezoning.”140 The New
York Court of Appeals failed to consider the relevance of any of these
points to a pretext analysis.

ing that the true purpose of the takings was “to confer a private benefit” on business interests because “any speculative public benefit would be incidental at best”).
132. See Franco, 930 A.2d at 173.
133. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
134. 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
135. See id. at 58.
136. See id. at 62.
137. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21-22 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
138. Id. at 21.
139. See id. at 19.
140. Id.
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Pretextual Motive

The Pennsylvania and Hawaii supreme courts interpret Kelo’s pretextual
taking inquiry as focusing primarily on the actual intentions of condemning
authorities and the plausibility of the condemning authority’s asserted
goals. In Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone,141 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Kelo as requiring the court to examine “the real or
fundamental purpose behind a taking,” emphasizing that “the true purpose
must primarily benefit the public.”142 The Hawaii Supreme Court adopted
a similar standard,143 as did several pre-Kelo federal court decisions.144
In Goldstein v. Pataki, the Second Circuit simply refused to consider any
evidence of improper motive, ruling that whenever a taking is “rationally
related to a classic public use,” it is impermissible to “give close scrutiny to
the mechanics of a taking . . . as a means to gauge the purity of the motives
of various government officials who approved it.”145 The court also made
clear that its definition of “classic public use” is extremely broad, noting
that private-to-private blight takings and “the creation of affordable housing” qualify.146
The Second Circuit’s refusal to consider evidence of motive was extremely unfortunate in light of the highly suspicious circumstances surrounding the taking. As discussed above,147 the ESDC decided to conduct
a blight study only after it and Ratner already intended to use eminent domain against the property owners.148 It also relied on a firm with a serious
141. 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007).
142. Id. at 337; see also In re O’Reilly, 5 A.3d 246, 250 (Pa. 2010) (quoting Middletown
Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 337 (Pa. 2007)).
143. See Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family P’ship, 198 P.3d 615, 647-49 (Haw.
2008) (holding that Kelo requires courts to look for “the actual purpose” of a taking to determine whether the official rationale was “a mere pretext”).
144. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (invalidating a taking because the official rationale of blight alleviation was a mere pretext for
“a scheme . . . to deprive the plaintiffs of their property . . . so a shopping-center developer
could buy [it] at a lower price”); Aaron v. Target Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1174-76
(E.D. Mo. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a property owner was likely to prevail on a claim that a taking ostensibly to alleviate blight was
actually intended to serve the interests of the Target corporation); Cottonwood Christian Ctr.
v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Courts
must look beyond the government’s purported public use to determine whether that is the
genuine reason or if it is merely pretext.”); 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“No judicial deference is required . . . where the ostensible public use is demonstrably pretextual.”).
145. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 62 (2d Cir. 2008).
146. Id. at 58.
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 189 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith,
J., dissenting).
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conflict of interest to conduct the study.149 All of this is at the very least
relevant evidence of pretextual intent.150
In Kaur, as in Goldstein, there was extensive evidence of pretextual motive inherent in the blight designation process. The fact that the ESDC relied on AKRF, despite its conflict of interest, and instructed the firm to use
a highly biased methodology is surely relevant.151
In addition, the Appellate Division found further evidence of improper
motive in the ESDC’s behavior with regard to its treatment of the property
owners’ Freedom of Information Law requests.152 The ESDC improperly
withheld key documents from the owners in order to prevent them from using them in administrative hearings assessing the validity of the planned
takings.153 As the Appellate Division explained,
[i]t is beyond dispute that, as the cutoff date to enter documents into the
record approached, the respondent and other agencies engaged in a lastditch effort to thwart the petitioners’ attempt to obtain documents, including those which were ordered by the courts of this State to be released and
turned over. . . .”154

The ESDC thus deprived the owners of vital information needed to challenge the project at the only time such evidence could be used. The failure
to release these documents indicates the extent to which the ESDC was
willing to take any action in order to push the project through, and provides
at least some additional evidence of pretextual motive.155 The New York
Court of Appeals’ ruling simply ignored that evidence.
C.

The Extent of the Pre-Condemnation Planning Process

The Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island Supreme Courts have relied on the absence of extensive advance public planning to indicate a pretextual taking.156 This theory builds on Kelo’s emphasis on the presence of
149. Id. at 167.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 892 N.Y.S.2d 8, 27-28 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009), rev’d, 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822 (2010).
153. Id. at 27-28.
154. Id.
155. Id. (plurality); id. at 30-32 (Richter, J., concurring).
156. See Mayor of Balt. v. Valsamaki, 916 A.2d 324, 352-53 (Md. 2007) (noting the absence of a clear plan for the use of the condemned property, and contrasting this absence
with the facts of Kelo); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007)
(concluding that “evidence of a well-developed plan of proper scope is significant proof that
an authorized purpose truly motivates a taking”); R.I. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., 892
A.2d 87, 104 (R.I. 2006) (emphasizing that “[t]he City of New London’s exhaustive prepa-
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an “integrated development plan” behind the takings upheld in that case.157
It is difficult to say exactly how much advance planning is needed under
this approach to ward off pretext claims.
In Goldstein v. Pataki, the Second Circuit rejected the idea that any significant scrutiny was required because of the “acknowledged fact that
Ratner was the impetus behind the Project, i.e., that he, not a state agency,
first conceived of developing Atlantic Yards . . . and that it was his plan for
the Project that the ESDC eventually adopted without significant modification.”158 If a planning process completely dominated by a private beneficiary does not qualify as pretextual, it is difficult to see what sort of process
would.
In Kaur as well, the relevant plan was developed by Columbia University—the very private interest that stood to benefit from the condemnations.159 The blight alleviation plan was produced after the condemning authority had already decided to condemn the property and transfer it to
Columbia.160 The Appellate Division found that “[t]he record discloses
that every document constituting the plan was drafted by the preselected
private beneficiary’s [Columbia’s] attorneys and consultants and architects.”161 As the Appellate Division concluded, “[t]he contrast between
ESDC’s scheme for the redevelopment of Manhattanville and New London’s plan for Fort Trumbull could not be more dramatic.”162 Although the
New London plan was far from free of special interest influence,163 at least
it was not developed in advance by the very private party that would eventually take over the condemned property.
D.

The Presence of a Known Private Beneficiary of the Taking

Both the majority and concurring opinions in Kelo note that there is a
greater risk of a pretextual taking when the taking’s private beneficiary is

ratory efforts that preceded the takings in Kelo stand in stark contrast to [the condemning
authority’s] approach in the case before us”).
157. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487-88 (2005); cf. Nicole S. Garnett, Planning as Public Use?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 444 (2007) (arguing that planning is
the main focus of Kelo’s pretext analysis).
158. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2008).
159. See Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 19-21.
160. See supra Part II.B.
161. Kaur, 892 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
162. Id. at 19.
163. See Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 236-38 (describing evidence of extensive influence by the Pfizer Corporation, which stood to benefit from the takings indirectly).
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known in advance.164 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily on
this factor in a 2008 decision. In Carole Media L.L.C. v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,165 the court upheld a taking of a firm’s license to post advertisements on public billboards owned by the New Jersey Transit Corporation.166 Although there was evidence that the new policy was adopted in
part because it was likely to favor the interests of a rival firm, All Vision,167
the court upheld the condemnations in large part because there was “no allegation that NJ Transit, at the time it terminated Carole Media’s existing
licenses, knew the identity of the successful bidder for the long-term licenses at those locations.”168
No one disputes that Ratner was the private beneficiary of the takings
upheld in Goldstein, and that his identity as such was well-known in advance of the decision to condemn.169 Yet neither the Second Circuit nor
the New York Court of Appeals gave any weight to this fact.170
Similarly, there is no doubt that Columbia was the expected beneficiary
of the Kaur condemnations, and that the ESDC was well aware of this reality.171 Nevertheless, in Kaur too, the New York Court of Appeals did not
attach any weight to the presence of a known private beneficiary.172
E.

Implications

In sum, both the New York Court of Appeals in Kaur and the Second
Circuit in Goldstein refused to give weight to any of the four factors identified in Kelo and various lower court decisions as possible indicators of pretextual takings. Nor did either ruling suggest any alternative test. The
Second Circuit did note that its decision “preserve[es] the possibility that a
fact pattern may one day arise in which the circumstances of the approval
process so greatly undermine the basic legitimacy of the outcome reached
164. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 n.6 (2005) (noting that it is
“difficult to accuse the government of having taken A’s property to benefit the private interests of B when the identity of B was unknown”); id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. 550 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2008).
166. Id. at 312.
167. Id. at 310-11.
168. Id. at 311. As a result of this ignorance, the court ruled that “this case cannot be the
textbook private taking involving a naked transfer of property from private party A to B
solely for B’s private use.” Id.
169. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2008).
170. See id.; Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164, 165-66 (N.Y.
2009).
171. See Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721, 725-26 (N.Y. 2010),
cert. denied sub nom. Tuck-It-Away, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 131 S. Ct. 822
(2010).
172. See id. at 724.
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that a closer objective scrutiny of the justification being offered is required.”173 But it is difficult to see what those circumstances might be if
neither subjective intent, nor the distribution of the projects costs and benefits, nor the presence of an identifiable private beneficiary who played a
key role in initiating the taking, is enough to trigger such “objective scrutiny.”
CONCLUSION
The New York Court of Appeals’ treatment of “blight” takings in
Goldstein and Kaur breaks new and dangerous ground in endorsing abusive
condemnations. It both defines blight more expansively than ever before
and allows blight designations to be obtained by extremely dubious means.
These include the use of consulting firms with severe conflicts of interest
and reliance on evidence of blight that may have been produced by the very
same private interest groups that stand to benefit from the condemnation
that the blight finding is intended to justify.
The New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit have also virtually ignored the federal Supreme Court’s mandate that “pretextual” takings remain unconstitutional even under the Court’s otherwise highly permissive public use jurisprudence.174
As a result of these two rulings, there are virtually no remaining constitutional limits on blight condemnations in New York state, including
America’s largest city.
To be sure, abusive blight condemnations still readily occur even under
less permissive legal regimes. Had the New York Court of Appeals
adopted a broad definition of blight but refused to countenance the use of
biased consulting firms or evidence of blight generated by the beneficiaries
of takings, government agencies would probably still be able to get a blight
designation for most, if not quite all, the areas potentially coveted by influential interest groups.
Even so, the court’s endorsement of blight designations produced by biased firms and based on conditions that interested parties helped create,
creates genuine harm. It makes it difficult to constrain blight condemnations even if the definition of blight were to be narrowed. A biased firm
could potentially manufacture evidence of more narrowly defined blight.
And an ambitious developer could allow such blight to develop on his land
in the hopes of using it to lobby for the use of eminent domain to acquire
nearby land that he or she covets. Effective eminent domain reform re-

173. Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 63.
174. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005).
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quires both narrowing the definition of “blight” and the reimposition of
constraints on corrupt blight designation practices.175

175. On the former point, see Somin, Grasping Hand, supra note 1, at 266-71. It is arguable that the use of eminent domain may do more harm than good, even in genuinely
blighted areas. See id. at 269-71; see also Eagle, supra note 107 (arguing that “‘blight condemnation’ is dubious at best” and that abatement, foreclosure, and private revitalization are
“more in accord with Constitutional requirements and more likely to produce transparent
and efficacious results”).

